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ABSTRACT
Enabling participation of demand-side flexibility in electricity mar-
kets is key to improving power system resilience and increasing
the penetration of renewable generation. In this work we are mo-
tivated by the curtailment of near-zero-marginal-cost renewable
resources during periods of oversupply, a particularly important
cause of inefficient generation dispatch. Focusing on shiftable load
in a multi-interval economic dispatch setting, we show that incom-
patible incentives arise for loads in the standard market formulation.
While the system’s overall efficiency increases from dispatching
flexible demand, the overall welfare of loads can decrease as a result
of higher spot prices. We propose a market design to address this
incentive issue. Specifically, by imposing a small number of addi-
tional constraints on the economic dispatch problem, we obtain
a mechanism that guarantees individual rationality for all market
participants while simultaneously obtaining a more efficient dis-
patch. Our formulation leads to a natural definition of a uniform,
time-varying flexibility price that is paid to loads to incentivize
flexible bidding. We provide theoretical guarantees and empirically
validate our model with simulations on real-world generation data
from California Independent System Operator (CAISO).
CCS CONCEPTS
•Hardware→ Renewable energy; •Mathematics of comput-
ing → Mathematical analysis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The traditional paradigm of generation following load is being
transformed as variable, non-dispatchable resources like solar and
wind are an ever increasing share of the generationmix. This creates
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situations, typically during midday, where there is an excess near-
zero marginal cost renewable generation which must be curtailed
in order to maintain supply-demand balance. While this scenario
might have seemed far-fetched even a few years ago, it is already
occurring in major markets. On October 11, 2020, renewables met
more that 100% of the total demand in Southern Australia for several
hours [3]. In the CAISO (California Independent System Operator)
market, solar regularly provides more that 60% of total generation
during the afternoon and reached an all-time peak of 80% in May
2019 [12]. Due to a generation queue dominated by renewables
and a 100% zero-emission target for 2045, over-generation from
renewables will become increasingly common in the California and
other large markets [1].
Storage and demand response are two approaches for shifting
surplus renewable generation from peak midday hours to peri-
ods of higher demand. In an influential 2017 report, researchers at
Lawrence Berkeley National Lab analyzed opportunities for demand
response and proposed the "Shape-Shift-Shed-Shimmy" taxonomy
of flexible loads [7]. They argue that each type of load flexibility is
applicable for a particular timescale and use case. Shift flexibility,
where the total energy consumed over the time horizon (e.g., 24
hours) remains constant but can be shifted between time inter-
vals, is identified as the form of demand response best suited to
accommodate renewable over-generation. Sources of shiftable load
include electric vehicle charging, commercial and residential HVAC,
and non-time-sensitive industrial processes.
Mechanisms and incentives for offering demand response have
been extensively studied but most often they focus on direct com-
pensation for load shedding or peak shaving. Demand response
programs implemented by ISOs (Independent System Operators)
and utilities tend to be tailored to that same goal. Despite the calls
for attention, mechanisms for Shift flexibility in particular remain
relatively understudied [7, 37]. The operational benefits of dispatch-
ing shiftable loads are clear to market operators, but as existing
markets do not invite significant demand-side participation, from
the consumer’s point of view the advantages are less clear. This
motivates the core questions of this work: Is a flexible load better off
offering its shiftable demand to the market operator than not? And, if
not, can we redesign the market to encourage loads to offer shiftable
demand to the marketplace?
Contributions. The answers are No and Yes. We prove that
there is incentive misalignment in traditional market designs where
flexible loads may prefer not to expose their flexibility to the mar-
ketplace. To address this, we introduce a new mechanism where
loads have incentives to offer flexibility and generator incentives
remain aligned with the social welfare objective. More specifically,
this paper makes the following contributions.
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First, we establish a market and utility model for analyzing
shiftable demand. Ours is a variant of the multi-interval market, ex-
tensively studiedwith ramping inequality constraints [26, 29, 31, 48]
where equality constraints are added to couple the demand con-
sumption in all periods. Our framework for load utility is derived
from the load utility model implied by the standard economic dis-
patch formulation.
Second, we identify a fundamental incentive incompatibility for
loads offering flexible dispatch while being compensated with the
standard electricity spot price. We show in Theorem 3.1 that even
in very simple scenarios, loads are worse off under flexible dispatch,
even as generators capture more profit and the efficiency of the
dispatch solution improves. This counter-intuitive situation arises
from the interplay between the time-coupling demand constraint
and the power balance constraint that holds in each time interval.
Third, we propose a new multi-interval economic dispatch mar-
ket that corrects the demand-side incentive incompatibility. Our
mechanism preserves core features of the existing structure while
making some novel changes: we add inequality constraints to con-
strain the demand allocation and clear the generation and demand
sides of the market separately in a two-step procedure that ensures
supply-demand balance and revenue adequacy. Loads that offer flex-
ibility are compensated for deviating from their nominal baseline
with a flexibility price, defined in Section 4, while inflexible loads
continue to pay the baseline spot price for energy. Our main result,
Theorem 4.3, proves that loads have incentives to offer flexibility un-
der the new market design without disturbing dispatch-following
incentives for generators.
Finally, in Section 5 we present a case study using generation
data from CAISO. The case study highlights the importance of en-
suring that shiftable loads have incentives to bid their flexibility
into the marketplace. Our results show that curtailment of renew-
able generation can be eliminated, leading to a 15% reduction in
the net generation costs.
Related work. This paper builds on and contributes to three
areas of the literature on electricity markets: (1) mechanisms for
demand response, (2) multi-interval dispatch, and (3) incentive
alignment in mechanism design.
Demand response has been extensively explored in both the
academic literature and in practice. In both contexts, interest in
demand response has mainly centered around rate-based demand
reduction [19, 22, 32, 45] and incentive-based programs [13]. In the
former category are time-of-use pricing [18], critical-peak pricing
[27], and real-time pricing [6], all schemes which use a given price
schedule to incentivize loads to consume energy during lower-cost
periods. In the latter group are programs like direct load control [21]
and emergency demand reduction [4] inwhich loads are given lump-
sum or per-event payments by the system operator in exchange for
the curtailment. Such programs are popular in practice since they
lower demand and spot prices during peak load hours.
A drawback of many of these existing designs is that they tend to
emphasize a particular variety of demand response—load shedding—
and do not explicitly offer incentives for other types of flexible load.
The demand response taxonomy in [7] identifies four major types
of demand response, each requiring their own dispatch and incen-
tive structures. A general mathematical formulation for optimal
dispatch of flexible load is notably given in [37] but the formula-
tion therein assumes knowledge of demand-side value functions.
In practice these are very difficult to determine, partly for practical
reasons (there are seldom opportunities for loads to reveal their
price elasticity) and partly due to historical reasons (electricity has
always been treated as an “on-demand” commodity) [33]. We are
not aware of any works that formally analyzes incentives for offer-
ing shiftable demand—identified as the most significant potential
source of demand-side flexibility in [7]—while also retaining the
established economic dispatch market structure.
Another important theme in the demand response literature is
strategic behavior by loads when reporting their baseline energy
consumption. Because demand response almost always defined as a
reduction from a baseline, there can be incentives for loads to inflate
their baselines to give the appearance of a larger load reduction in
real-time. There are a number of works that analyzed incentives
for misreporting and proposed mechanisms to discourage it [14, 16,
39, 40, 46]. While we retain the concept of a baseline in this work
for convenience, our model is compatible with schemes to limit the
incentives to misreport it, e.g., [41].
Multi-interval markets are of growing interest as a way to guar-
antee reliable electricity dispatch in the face of uncertain generation.
Several substantial works have explored multi-interval market de-
sign including [26, 29, 31, 48]. The intertemporal constraints in all of
these are limited to ramping limits, which only couple adjacent time
periods. In contrast, along the lines of the model proposed in [37],
our work considers equality constraints on demand consumption
that couple all time periods together. This type of inter-temporal
constraint introduces a particular incentive misalignment—a the
focus of this paper.
More broadly, our work connects to the topic of mechanism
design. Analysis of incentive and participation constraints in mar-
ket mechanisms was pioneered by Hurwicz, Groves, and Ledyard,
among others [25, 34]. The study of incentives in electricity markets
has a rich history beginning with the seminal work of Schweppe
[44] and has strongly influenced subsequent research on congestion
pricing [15, 28] and non-convex pricing [8, 24, 30, 36]. In addition
there has been research on market manipulation by generators, e.g.,
through market power and/or strategic curtailment of renewable
generation. Some notable recent results in this direction include
[10, 35, 42, 43]. While this body of work establishes a framework
for analyzing electricity market incentives, it does so almost ex-
clusively for the generation side of the market [38]. Efficiently
dispatching demand-side resources to meet system needs requires
similar evaluation of incentive structures.
2 MARKET MODEL
We study an economic dispatch market for energy that the market
operator (e.g., ISO/RTO) uses to calculate dispatch quantities and
settlement prices. Our model is distinctive from the standard short-
term setting in several important ways. First, we consider a multi-
interval market with intertemporal equality constraints, which
are necessary to model shiftable demand. This contrasts with an
existing body of work on multi-interval markets with intertemporal
inequality constraints. Second, we explicitly model and dispatch
the demand side of the market. Typically demand is taken to be
2
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fixed with only generation being variable. Third, we evaluate the
welfare of both generators and loads in our analysis of incentives.
As loads are the participants providing demand response flexibility,
explicitly incorporating them into the social welfare formulation is
crucial for quantifying the impacts of flexibility.
2.1 Market participants
The market has 𝑁 generators, indexed by 𝑖 , and operates over
discrete time horizon of length𝑇 , indexed by 𝑡 . The energy produced
by generator 𝑖 in interval 𝑡 is denoted by 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∈ R. We denote
generators’ production over the time horizon with the generation
matrix P ∈ R𝑁×𝑇 . It is sometimes convenient to refer to individual
row/columns of this matrix. The 𝑡-th column, themarket production
vector for time 𝑡 , is p𝑡 = [𝑝1,𝑡 , . . . , 𝑝𝑁,𝑡 ]⊤ ∈ R𝑁 . Analogously, the
𝑖-th row, generator 𝑖’s production across the entire time horizon,
is denoted p𝑖 = [𝑝𝑖,1, . . . , 𝑝𝑖,𝑇 ]⊤ ∈ R𝑇 . Generator cost functions
𝑐𝑖,𝑡 (𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ) : R → R+ are assumed to be convex, monotonically
increasing, sub-differentiable, and zero-crossing. This last property
requires that 0 ∈ dom(𝑐𝑖,𝑡 ) and 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 (0) = 0. For convenience, we
refer to the total cost function for each generator as




The market includes 𝑀 demand participants, which we refer
to as loads, indexed by 𝑗 . Each load consumes a fixed amount of
energy 𝐸 𝑗 over the 𝑇 periods. We use 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ∈ R to denote the the
energy consumed by load 𝑗 in interval 𝑡 . Like with generators, we
stack the 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 into a demand matrix D ∈ R𝑀×𝑇 . We refer to the 𝑡-th
column with d𝑡 = [𝑑1,𝑡 , . . . , 𝑑𝑀,𝑡 ]⊤ ∈ R𝑀 and the 𝑗-th row with
d𝑗 = [𝑑 𝑗,1, . . . , 𝑑 𝑗,𝑇 ]⊤ ∈ R𝑇 . Loads do not have preference functions
that vary with consumption in each time interval. However, they do
report a preferred baseline in each interval 𝑑0
𝑗,𝑡
∈ R. 𝐸 𝑗 is defined





The use of a baseline is a common assumption in demand re-
sponse (see e.g., [45]) that we retain here in order to provide a
natural definition of flexibility Δ 𝑗 as the amount that the actual dis-





The structure of bids, the market clearing procedure, and the settle-
ment structure are laid out in the following steps:
1. All participants (loads, generators) submit their bids. For
loads, this takes the form of a triple
(𝐸 𝑗 , d𝑗 , d𝑗 ) ∈ R+ × R
𝑇
+ × R𝑇+
that consists of their energy requirement and lower/upper
bounds on consumption in each time period.
1
For generators,
the bid takes the form of a pair
(𝑐𝑖 , p𝑖 ) ∈ C × R𝑇+
C is the set of all functions 𝑐 : R𝑇+ → R that are convex,
monotonically increasing, and contain the origin. Generators
1
As d𝑗 is assumed to be non-negative, all components of the bid are non-negative.
only submit their upper bounds on production; to avoid non-
convexities arising from unit commitment, generation lower
bounds are assumed to be 0.
2. The market operator collects bids and solves a market clear-
ing optimization problem, defined in (1a) - (1e). Its solution
provides an allocation of energy to each participant (the
dispatch) and a unit price for energy in each time period.
3. Generators are obligated to produce the dispatch quantities
and are paid the unit price for whatever they produce. Loads
must consume the dispatch quantities and must pay the
unit price for whatever they consume. If any participant
deviates from the dispatch schedule, the market operator
has the ability to administratively penalize the violator, e.g.,
via large monetary penalties or exclusion from the market.
2
The centerpiece of the market structure is the market clearing
optimization problem in Step 2. We study a version of the economic
dispatch problem used by ISOs, made distinctive in our case by the
multi-interval setting and the inclusion of intertemporal equality
constraints. For the sake of focusing our analysis on the impacts
of these unique features, we do not consider unit commitment,
start-up/no-load costs, and line congestion. We also ignore ramping
constraints (i.e., intertemporal inequality constraints) for both loads
and generators. As previously mentioned, these have been stud-
ied extensively on the generation side of market in [26, 29, 31, 48]
among others. Finally, we consider a “single-shot” market-clearing
procedure where dispatch quantities and prices are determined at
the beginning of the dispatch horizon and adhered to through the re-
mainder of it.
3
Relaxing these simplifying assumptions is discussed
as future work in the Conclusion but we note here that incentive
misalignment for loads arises even in the most straightforward
setting of the problem.
The market clearing optimization problem is as follows:
min
p𝑗 ,d𝑗 ∀𝑖, 𝑗
∑
𝑖
𝑐𝑖 (p𝑖 ) (1a)
subject to
_𝑡 ⊥ 1⊤d𝑡 − 1⊤p𝑡 = 0 ∀𝑡 (1b)
𝜌 𝑗 ⊥ 1⊤d𝑗 = 𝐸 𝑗 ∀𝑗 (1c)
`−𝑖 , `
+
𝑖 ⊥ 0 ≤ p𝑖 ≤ p𝑖 ∀𝑖 (1d)
[−𝑗 , [
+
𝑗 ⊥ d𝑗 ≤ d𝑗 ≤ d𝑗 ∀𝑗 (1e)
In the above, (1a) is the total generation cost; (1b) are the power
balance constraints in each interval; (1c) enforces that each load’s
energy requirement 𝐸 𝑗 is met over the time horizon (these are the
intertemporal equality constraints); and (1d) - (1e) ensure that the
dispatch satisfies participants’ minimum and maximum produc-
tion/consumption limits.
Given an optimal solution to (1), the time-varying non-negative




where _∗𝑡 is the optimal dual variable for (1b).
2
This requirement reflects the auction design of most North American ISOs, see e.g.,
Section 2.1 in [17].
3
The only assumption needed to support this is that the d0
𝑗
are known at 𝑡 = 1 and do
not adjust over the course of the time horizon.
3
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By offering flexibility in the form of a box constraint on de-
mand as in (1e), the efficiency of the dispatch is improved. This is
expressed in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.1. Let OPT0 be the optimal value of problem (1a) -
(1e) when 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 = 𝑑
0
𝑗,𝑡
for all 𝑗 and 𝑡 , assuming it exists. Let
OPT be the optimal value of the problem where 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑑
0
𝑗,𝑡
< 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 for
at least one 𝑗 or 𝑡 . Then OPT ≤ OPT0.
Theorem 2.1 states that dispatching demand-side flexibility offers
benefits to the market allocation in the form of lower cost (greater
efficiency). A proof of this result follows immediately from the fact
that relaxing constraint (1e) results in a large feasible set, which
therefore gives a lower bound on the optimal value in the case
where the constraint is tight. The existence of OPT is guaranteed
by the existence of OPT
0
.
Notice that the formulation of economic dispatch in (1) reduces to
the standard setting (𝑇 independent sequential economic dispatch
problems) when d𝑗 = d𝑗 = d𝑗 . In this situation, constraints (1c) and
(1e) are redundant and d𝑡 in (1b) can be replaced by d0𝑡 .
2.3 Utility models for generators and loads
An important goal of this paper is to evaluate whether the market
allocation, given by the optimal primal solution of (1), and the
market-clearing price, given by the optimal dual variable of (1b),
are aligned with the individual incentives. To study this question
we need to introduce definitions of utility and the individual utility
maximization problem for both loads and generators.
Let 𝜋 ∈ R𝑇+ be the vector of market-clearing energy prices for
the time horizon. We assume all agents are price takers and define
the following utility models for generators and loads respectively.
Definition 2.2. Let p𝑖 ∈ R𝑇 be generator 𝑖’s production vector and




 0 ≤ p𝑖 ≤ p𝑖 } ⊆ R𝑇 .
Generator 𝑖’s utility is defined as
𝑢𝑖 (p𝑖 ;𝜋) := 𝜋⊤p𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 (p𝑖 ) . (3)
We assume a generator acts rationally when facing the given




s.t. p𝑖 ∈ P𝑖 .
(4)
In contrast to generators, loads do not have a cost function and
are only constrained by a required amount of energy to be delivered
over the time horizon, 𝐸 𝑗 . Instead we assume that there is a constant
utility value𝑈 𝑗 ∈ R+ that represents the value a load receives from
having 𝐸 𝑗 satisfied. We assume that the load is indifferent to how
energy is allocated across the intervals, as long as 𝐸 𝑗 is delivered
and upper/lower consumption limits are respected.
Definition 2.3. Let d𝑗 ∈ R𝑇 be load 𝑗 ’s consumption vector and




 d𝑗 ≤ d𝑗 ≤ d𝑗 , 1⊤d𝑗 = 𝐸 𝑗 } ⊆ R𝑇 .





= 𝑈 𝑗 − 𝜋⊤d𝑗 . (5)
We again assume each load acts rationally when facing the given
price schedule 𝜋 and therefore seeks to maximize its utility with
argmax
d𝑗
𝑢 𝑗 (d𝑗 ;𝜋)
s.t. d𝑗 ∈ D𝑗 .
(6)
A feature of this presentation of utility that deserves comment
and justification is our representation of the positive “value” com-
ponent of load utility with a constant 𝑈 𝑗 . This choice is made to
align with the classical auction-based economic dispatch model in
Section 2.2. Specifically, if we use utility functions (3) and (5) to
construct the market’s social welfare maximization problem subject
to a shared market clearing constraint and private feasibility con-
straints, we get exactly the auction-based economic dispatch model
(i.e., cost minimization) of the market described by (1). To see this,
recall that the market’s social welfare maximization problem is
max






𝑢 𝑗 (d𝑗 ;𝜋)
s.t. 1⊤p𝑡 = 1⊤d𝑡 ∀𝑡
p𝑖 ∈ P𝑖 ∀𝑖
d𝑗 ∈ D𝑗 ∀𝑗
(7)




∀𝑖, 𝑗 of (7),








Plugging in (3) and (5) into the objective function of (7), we get∑
𝑖
𝑢𝑖 (p;𝜋 ) +
∑
𝑗
𝑢 𝑗 (d𝑗 ;𝜋 ) =
∑
𝑖
𝜋⊤p𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖 (p𝑖 ) +
∑
𝑗






















It is clear that the objective function of (7) differs from (1a) by only
a constant factor and the constraint sets of the two problems are
identical. Therefore, they have the same optimal solution (although
the optimal value differs by a factor of
∑
𝑗 𝑈 𝑗 ). While the choice of
𝑈 𝑗 does not impact the optimal solution, intuitively, it should be
a positive number, large enough so that 𝑈 𝑗 − 𝜋⊤d𝑗 > 0 for most
realizations of 𝜋 and d𝑗 . However this condition is not necessary
for our analysis of prices and dispatch quantities.
3 PARTICIPATION INCENTIVES
Our first set of results focuses on understanding the consequences
of dispatching flexibility via the classical market formulation de-
scribed in the previous section. We show in this section that, though
dispatch-following incentives for generators remain intact, partici-
pation incentives for loads are misaligned and offering flexibility
(i.e., d𝑗 < d𝑗 ) to the market operator is not necessarily rational.
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3.1 Participation incentives for loads
Participation constraints affect a rational agent’s behavior. In par-
ticular, given a choice to enter into a market/mechanism or not,
it is expected that a rational agent only does so if their utility is
higher under participation than their best alternative. To put this
precisely for the case of loads in our model, let d0
𝑗
be the allocation
a load receives outside of the flexibility mechanism (i.e., the load
simply consumes its reported baseline). Let d′
𝑗
be the allocation a
load receives by participating in the mechanism. 𝑗 ’s participation




Once a participant submits its bid to the market operator, it
is obliged to obey the dispatch instruction that comes in return
when the market is cleared. We show in the following theorem
that, depending on the market outcome, loads can end up worse
off by offering flexibility under the energy price in (2), despite the
increase in efficiency that flexibility offers to the market as a whole
(established in Theorem 2.1).
Theorem 3.1. Assume the baseline solution d0
𝑗
∀𝑗 is feasible for
(1a) - (1e). Under the market dispatch (1a) - (1e) and energy price 𝜋𝑡
given in (2), participation constraints for loads are are not guaran-
teed. That is, there exist choices of parameters 𝑐𝑖 (·), d0𝑗 , p𝑖 , d𝑗 , d𝑗 with
𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 for some 𝑗, 𝑡 such that 𝑢 𝑗 (d′𝑗 ) < 𝑢 𝑗 (d
0
𝑗
) for some 𝑗 .
Proof. Our proof takes the form of a counterexample. Consider
a market environment with 2 time periods: 𝑡 = 1, 2. There is a single
load with demand given by d = [𝑑1, 𝑑2]⊤ and a single generator
with generation given by p = [𝑝1, 𝑝2]⊤. The unit generation costs
are c = [1, 2]⊤ and the baseline demand is d0 = [2, 2]⊤. Thus 𝐸 = 4.
Generation is constrained by p = [0, 0]⊤, p = [3, 3]⊤, and demand
by d = d0 (1−𝛼) ≤ d0 (1+𝛼) = d, where 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1]. We parameterize
the demand lower/upper bounds with the constant 𝛼 to allow us
to vary the offered flexibility between 0 (𝛼 = 0) and its maximum
(𝛼 = 1).4
Market dispatch model (1a) - (1e) with these parameters gives




s.t. _ ⊥ p = d
1⊤d = 4
0 ≤ p ≤ 3 · 1
2(1 − 𝛼) · 1 ≤ d ≤ 2(1 + 𝛼) · 1.
(8)
By (2) the energy price vector is 𝜋 = _∗. We assume the value
constant for the load is 0 and take the optimal solution of (8) to be
(p′, d′, _′), we have the following form of load utility:
𝑢 (d′) = −_′⊤d′.
We solve (8) for 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1] and compute demand utility 𝑢 (d′;𝛼).
Since 𝛼 parameterizes the "amount" of flexibility demand offers,
increasing values of 𝛼 correspond to greater demand flexibility
(looser bounds on min/max consumption in each interval). The
results are shown in Figure 1.
4𝛼 = 1 is the maximum because demand cannot be negative. The upper bound does








Figure 1: Demand utility vs. 𝛼 ∈ [0, 1]
Maximum consumer utility of −5 is reached as 𝛼 ↑ 0.5 and
𝑢 (d0) ≥ 𝑢 (d) only for 𝛼 < 0.5. That is, the demand is worse off by
offering for 𝛼 ≥ 0.5 than none at all. In fact, if we had chosen the
parameters differently (e.g., 𝑑0 arbitrarily close to 𝑝 in one interval),
the demand participation constraint is violated for all 𝛼 > 0. □
Remark:We retain the standard price-taking assumption in the
above proof. With a single generator, this may be practically unrealis-
tic. At the expense of greater complexity additional generators can be
considered without changing the qualitative behavior we highlight.
The purpose of the proof is to demonstrate that incentive violations
arise even in the simplest of market settings.
Analyzing which generation constraints in (1d) bind as 𝛼 varies
in the counterexample above gives insight into how misaligned
incentives for loads come about.
Analogously to how a marginal generator 𝑖 can be defined in
the single-period economic dispatch, we define a marginal pair:
generator and interval (𝑖, 𝑡). If 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 −1
⊤d0
𝑡
≥ 0, then flexible demand
can shift to 𝑡 from costlier intervals to take advantage of this excess
supply without changing the price _𝑡 . However, once the upper
bound is exceeded for the marginal pair (i.e., 1⊤d0
𝑡
> 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ), _
∗
𝑡
jumps up to the marginal cost of the next cheapest marginal pair.
This surprising behavior occurs because time periods are coupled
together through constraint (1c) Adding constraints on d𝑗 that
prevent this jump motivates the mechanism proposed in Section 4.
3.2 Participation incentives for generators
The previous section addresses the incentive misalignment for loads
under the standard market structure. One may worry that a similar
misalignment happens for generators. In this section we show that
there is no such issue on the generator side of the market, i.e., that
utility-maximizing decisions of the generators exactly match the
dispatch decision by the market operator.
Specifically, the following theorem states that the optimal solu-
tion of the market dispatch problem (1a) - (1e) provides dispatch
following incentives to generators, provided we treat generators
as pricetakers. Along the way, we also show that generators do
not have negative profit (i.e., participation constraints are satisfied).
Throughout, we make the standard assumption that (1a) - (1e) has
a feasible point.




∀𝑖, 𝑗 be the optimal primal solutions of
(1a) - (1e). The energy prices are 𝜋 := _∗ where _∗ is the vector of
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s.t. p𝑖 ∈ P𝑖
Further, 𝑢𝑖 (p∗𝑖 ) ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix A. □
Note that this theorem extends a well-known result for single-
period economic dispatch to our multi-interval setting with equality
constraints.
4 INCENTIVIZING FLEXIBILITY
Section 3 highlights that loads have an incentive not to reveal their
flexibility under the standard market design where only the energy
price is used for settlement. This is problematic since exploiting the
flexibility of loads is essential for system reliability, avoiding curtail-
ment of renewable energy, and improving the economic efficiency
of the dispatch. This section presents the main contribution of the
paper: a new market design that ensures both loads and generation
have incentives that are aligned with the market operator’s and,
specifically, provides incentives for loads to reveal their flexibility
to the market. First we introduce the market design and prove its
incentive properties and following, in Section 5, we illustrate the
market design using a case study.
4.1 A market design for flexibility
Our proposed design adopts a similar structure to the standard
market while introducing three important components: (1) a small
number of additional constraints on the demand allocation, (2) a
time-varying price ^𝑡 for flexibility, and (3) a two-stage market
clearing scheme for the demand side of the market.
Before presenting the mechanism we must introduce some nota-






be the smallest marginal cost (over all 𝑖 and 𝑡 ) under the baseline
allocation. Second, define T ⊆ {1, . . . ,𝑇 } to be the subset of in-





) = 𝑐min for at least one
𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑁 }. T c is the set of all intervals that do not meet this
condition. Together, T ¤∪ T c = {1, . . . ,𝑇 }.5 In what follows, we
assume that neither T and T c is empty. Third, for each 𝑡 ∈ T ,
define a generator index set
I𝑡 := {𝑖 |
𝜕𝑐𝑖,𝑡
𝜕𝑝𝑖,𝑡











In the real-world scenario of renewable curtailment, 𝑐min = 0 (since marginal cost of














This (regrettably heavy) notation makes precise the amount of
available excess capacity at the lowest price 𝑐min in the baseline
dispatch. Observe that when the 𝑐𝑖 are linear, 𝑝
cap
𝑖,𝑡
= 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 for 𝑖 ∈ I𝑡 .
With this notation in hand, we summarize the structure of the
market mechanism. Additional discussion of each step is provided
following the exposition of the procedure.
1. Generators submit bids (𝑐𝑖 , p𝑖 ) and loads submit bids (d0𝑗 , d𝑗 , d𝑗 )
to the market operator.
2. Market operator collects bids, forms the market-clearing op-
timization problem (1a) - (1e) with the additional constraint





, 𝜋0) ∀𝑖, 𝑗 .
3. Market operator re-solves (1a) - (1e) with the addition of
three new constraints:
1⊤d𝑡 ≤ 𝑃cap𝑡 ∀𝑡 ∈ T (9a)
𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 ∀𝑗, ∀𝑡 ∈ T (9b)
𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 ∀𝑗, ∀𝑡 ∈ T
c
(9c)
An interim solution and prices are computed: (p̃𝑖 , ˜d𝑗 , ?̃?) ∀𝑖, 𝑗 .
4. The market operator defines a flexibility price
^ = ^ (d0𝑗 , ˜d𝑗 , 𝜋
0, ?̃?) ∈ R𝑇 (10)
as a function of optimal solutions of the two market clearing
problems. (We discuss the precise form of ^ in Section 4.3.)
5. The market operator solves a demand dispatch problem (11a)
- (11f), producing a final allocation for demand: d∗
𝑗
∀𝑗 .
6. Generators are dispatched to produce energy p̃𝑖 at price ?̃? .
Loads are dispatched to consume energy d∗
𝑗
at price 𝜋0 and
contribute flexibility Δ∗
𝑗
compensated with price ^.
We now walk through the steps in more detail, beginning with
Step 2. Step 2 establishes a baseline allocation that is used later in
the procedure to ensure that participation constraints are satisfied.
In Step 3, additional inequalities (9a) - (9c) constrain the demand
dispatch to a desirable region. (9a) enforces that the total demand
does not exceed the total maximum capacity of the cheapest gener-
ator(s) in the interval—provided that there is spare capacity under
the baseline solution. (9b) ensures that demand can only increase
if there is excess cheapest generation in a period. (9c) guarantees
that demand can only decrease during intervals where all of the
cheapest generation is already dispatched. These additional linear
inequalities only add |T | + 𝑇 constraints to the market dispatch
problem, which already has (1 +𝑀 + 𝑁 )𝑇 +𝑀 constraints. Due to
the assumption that T and T c are non-empty, a solution to (9a) -
(9c) exists: namely D0.
Step 4 defines a flexibility unit price ^ . The definition of a flexibil-
ity price is central to our proposed mechanism. Rather than enforce
a specific price function, here we present properties that a price of
flexibility should satisfy. Later in Section 4.3 we provide examples
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that satisfy the given properties. Before introducing them, we first
we define the concept of a flexibility surplus.
Definition 4.1. The flexibility surplus 𝑆 :=
∑
𝑡 (𝜋0𝑡 − ?̃?𝑡 )1⊤ ˜d𝑡 is the
difference between the total demand-side energy payment if demand
were paying baseline energy price 𝜋0𝑡 and the total demand-side pay-
ment when demand pays the price, ?̃?𝑡 . Because of Lemma B.2 (see
Appendix B) and constraint (1c), 𝑆 ≥ 0. We interpret 𝑆 as the improve-
ment in welfare (over the baseline) of the demand side of the market
as a whole when the dispatch ˜d𝑡 optimally utilizes flexibility.
Now we establish properties that should be satisfied by a flexi-
bility price ^:
• ^ is uniform (each load faces the same ^)
• ^𝑡 ≥ 0when
∑
𝑗 Δ 𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 0 and ^𝑡 ≤ 0when
∑
𝑗 Δ 𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 0. This
means that the payment for both up and down flexibility is
non-negative, as at least some flexibility in both directions
is necessary to dispatch shiftable demand.
• The sum of all flexibility payments equals the flexibility
surplus:
∑
𝑡 ^𝑡1⊤ ( ˜d𝑡 − d0𝑡 ) = 𝑆.
This last property is natural, as our scheme distributes the surplus
arising from the increased economic efficiency of the flexibility
dispatch to the loads that provide this flexibility. Another desirable
property we seek when constructing ^𝑡 is that its magnitude should
reflect the value of flexibility to the system in interval 𝑡 .
Step 5maximizes social welfare for the demand side of themarket
given flexibility price ^ and energy price 𝜋0. In order to construct
this welfaremaximization problem, we need to update the definition
of demand utility with a term that quantifies the benefit that comes
from offering flexibility.
Definition 4.2. Let d𝑗 ∈ R𝑇 be load 𝑗 ’s consumption vector and ^
and 𝜋 be the flexibility and energy price vectors, respectively. d0
𝑗
is
the load’s reported baseline. Then demand utility is given by
𝑢∗𝑗 (d𝑗 ;𝜋, ^, d
0
𝑗 ) = 𝑈 𝑗 − 𝜋
⊤d𝑗 + ^⊤ (d𝑗 − d0𝑗 )
Next, we solve a demand allocation optimization where the total
demand dispatch amount in each interval is fixed to be equal to the
total interim demand dispatch from Step 3. This allows the settle-
ment for the generation side of the market to remain unaffected by





𝑢∗𝑗 (d𝑗 ) (11a)
subject to
1⊤d𝑗 = 𝐸 𝑗 ∀𝑗 (11b)
d𝑗 ≤ d𝑗 ≤ d𝑗 ∀𝑗 (11c)
𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 ∀𝑗, ∀𝑡 ∈ T (11d)
𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 ∀𝑗, ∀𝑡 ∈ T
c
(11e)
1⊤d𝑡 = 1⊤ ˜d𝑡 ∀𝑡 (11f)
The optimal solution of the above problem d𝑗 ∗ determines the
actual consumption of load 𝑗 over the horizon.
Finally, Step 6 settles the market with (p̃𝑖 ∀𝑖, ?̃?) for generators
and (d∗
𝑗
∀𝑗, 𝜋0, ^) for loads. Load 𝑗 pays 𝜋0⊤d∗
𝑗
for energy because
it is the price it would have payed in the baseline scenario. The load
receives ^⊤Δ∗
𝑗
for deviating by Δ∗
𝑗
from its baseline.
4.2 Analyzing participation incentives
The following theorem establishes properties for both generator and
load utility under the proposed market mechanism and settlement
scheme. We show that incentives are aligned on both sides of the
market.
Theorem 4.3. Let (p̃𝑖 , d∗𝑗 ,Δ
∗
𝑗
) be the energy and flexibility alloca-
tion from the market mechanism. Let (?̃?, 𝜋0, ^) be the corresponding
energy and flexibility prices. Then
(i) (p̃𝑖 , d∗𝑗 ,Δ
∗
𝑗
) clears the market;
(ii) (p̃𝑖 , d∗𝑗 ,Δ
∗
𝑗
, ?̃?, 𝜋0, ^) is revenue neutral for the market operator;
(iii) (p̃𝑖 , ?̃?) provides dispatch-following incentives for generators





, 𝜋0, ^) satisfies participation constraints for loads. Specif-








(v) For 𝑗 for which Δ∗
𝑗,𝑡




0, ^, d0𝑗 ) ≤ 𝑢 𝑗 ( ˜d𝑗 ; ?̃?);
For 𝑗 for which |Δ∗
𝑗,𝑡





0, ^, d0𝑗 ) ≥
∑
𝑗
𝑢 𝑗 ( ˜d𝑗 ; ?̃?) .
Statement (v) is of particular importance and highlights that
loads are better off offering flexibility than not: no load becomes
worse off than at its baseline consumption but loads that do offer
flexibility are (weakly) better off as a group than those that do not.
Proof. See Appendix C.
□
4.3 A price for flexibility
A core piece of our proposed market design is the flexibility price ^ .
How to properly compensate demand for flexibility is a challenging
open question. Flexibility, as defined in this work, is a public good:
in the interim, energy price-only settlement (P̃, D̃, ?̃?), even those
loads who do not offer relaxed bounds on their consumption (i.e.,
offer flexibility to the market) still benefit from others that do by
enjoying a lower price. To address this, our mechanism directly
pays flexible loads that based on how much of the flexibility they
offer is dispatched. We proceed in two stages: first we define a
flexibility price ^ that satisfies certain desirable properties (Step
4 in the mechanism); and second, we compute an allocation of
energy and flexibility that maximizes individual utility while also
respecting the previously-determined generation dispatch (Step 5
in the mechanism).
To this point, we have made the second stage concrete with (11a)
- (11f) but we have not yet given specific examples of flexibility
prices that satisfy the desirable properties of ^ listed in Step 4
above. In this section we propose three different flexibility prices,
commenting on their relative advantages. An interesting future
research direction is to explore other forms of this price.
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4.3.1 Optimization-based. Our first approachis to directly solve








^𝑡1⊤ ( ˜d𝑡 − d0𝑡 )
^𝑡 ≥ 0 ∀𝑡 ∈ T
^𝑡 ≤ 0 ∀𝑡 ∈ T c
A benefit of this approach is that the choice of an objective
function 𝑓 (^) can be made in order to enforce desired structural
properties. For example, setting 𝑓 (^) = | |^ | |2 yields a smooth price
schedule. If prices that weight high-value time-periods more are
desired, then one could have 𝑓 (^) = | |^ | |1.6
The adaptability of this formulation of ^ is its main advantage.
One potential disadvantage is that it does not yield a closed-form
representation of ^ in general, which could make the price diffi-
cult to interpret. The subsequent two designs we consider provide
closed-form representations of ^.
4.3.2 Budget-balance. A contrasting formulation of ^ is based on














This condition states that the total payments to generators equals
the total energy payments from demand minus the total flexibility
payments to loads. Noting that 1⊤p̃𝑡 = 1⊤ ˜d𝑡 = 1⊤d∗𝑡 and enforcing










This form of ^𝑡 satisfies our desired properties but it does have
an important drawback. When 𝑡 ∈ T , ?̃?𝑡 = 𝜋0𝑡 = 𝑐min, which
implies that ^𝑡 = 0. So, ^𝑡 is never strictly positive, which leads to
only down-flexibility (Δ𝑡 < 0) being rewarded. Further, for 𝑡 ∈ T ,
^𝑡 = 0 and so the prices do not capture the time-varying value of
flexibility for those intervals. The following design avoids these
disadvantages.
4.3.3 Flexibility surplus. Another closed-form version of ^𝑡 can be


























) , 𝑡 ∈ T c
This form of ^𝑡 is the product of three terms in both cases. The first,
𝑆
2
, divides the total flexibility surplus evenly between up- and down-
flexibility periods. The second term distributes that half-surplus
amongst the time intervals. For 𝑡 ∈ T , an interval receives an
amount proportional to its surplus (i.e., curtailed) lowest-cost gen-
eration. For 𝑡 ∈ T c, an interval receives the amount proportional
to the interim price ?̃?𝑡 in that time period. The third term divides
6
If 𝑓 (^) is a norm, then this formulation has the additional property that ^𝑡 = 0 only
if 1⊤ ( ˜d𝑡 − d0𝑡 ) = 0. This means that intervals that do not dispatch flexibility will not
have a non-zero price.
by the total allocation of flexibility, as determined by the dispatch
from (1a) - (1e) with (9a) - (9c).
Like the previous two flexibility prices, this ^ satisfies all of the
desired properties including budget balance. Its two-part specifica-
tion reflects the different function flexibility has in T versus T c.
In T , flexibility allows otherwise-curtailed low-cost generation
to be dispatched. In T c, flexibility allows for lesser amounts of
more-costly generation to be dispatched. While this formulation
addresses the zero-price shortcoming of the budget-balance for-
mulation and has a closed form representation, it is vulnerable to
volatility when 1⊤d∗𝑡 − 1⊤d0𝑡 is small.
Comparing these three formulations, it is worth highlighting
that, while a closed-form ^ might be desirable for reasons conve-
nience and interpretability, the optimized-based approach is more
principled and adaptable. For this reason we choose to implement
that version of the flexibility price in the case study in the next
section.
5 CASE STUDY
We conclude the paper with a demonstration of the our new market
dispatch of flexibility on a test case derived from the real-world
CAISO market. Our numerical results show a significant increase
in utility for loads when they allow their flexibility to be dispatched
by the market operator, thus highlighting the value of redesigning
the market to ensure participation incentives of loads are aligned.
5.1 Setup
Disaggregated demand-side data for bulk electricity markets is not
readily available [23]. We therefore take existing publicly-available
generation and aggregate load data from CAISO and simulate a
demand side to to the market. Our simulations are implemented in
Python and all optimization problems are solved with CVXPY[5, 20].
The simulation were run on a 2019 MacbookPro (2.8 GHz Quad-
Core i7, 16GB RAM).
Throughout our experiments, we ran the single-shot market
mechanism described in Section 4, which assumes an accurate
demand forecast, and computed the flexibility price ^ using the
optimization-based formulation.
The test cases are constructed as follows. Generation time series
data, disaggregated by resource type (e.g., renewable, hydro, coal),
from July 2, 2020 is obtained from [11]. The data have observations
every 5 minutes for 24 hours (288 total). At their peak, renewables
(e.g., wind, solar, small hydro, biomass) account for approx. 60% of
the net generation.We clean the data by removing trivial generation
resources like batteries and negative values for solar generation
at night (due to concentrating solar); the result is 6 generation
resource types: renewables, natural gas, large hydro, nuclear, coal,
and external imports from adjacent control areas. The aggregate
demand 𝐷0 profile is obtained from the resulting net generation.
We scale up the entire renewable profile by 220% so that there is
a set of intervals T where renewable generation alone exceeds
aggregate demand and thus renewables must be curtailed. As we
noted previously, this scenario is not (yet) the case in California
but in other markets has already begun occurring [3].
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(a) Baseline dispatch (demand does not offer flexibil-
ity)


















(b) Flexibile dispatch (demand offers flexibility)















(c) Individual load profile for 𝑗 = 29: baseline (black)
and flexible dispatch (red)
Figure 2: Comparison of the baseline market with the proposed market design in a CAISO case study.
We assume that conventional generation types and imports are
dispatchable up and down without ramping limits, whereas renew-
ables can only be curtailed. We also make the simplifying assump-
tion that conventional generation can produce any amount from 0
to their upper limits, which are taken from the original data to be
the maximum production at any point in the 24 hour window. Unit
cost data in $/MWh are the Variable O&M costs for 2020 from EIA’s
Annual Energy Outlook, see Table 1 in [2]. Unit costs for imports
were assumed to be the average of costs for the other generation
types present in our simulation.
The aggregate demand profile from the CAISO data (black dotted
line in Figure 2a) is disaggregated proportionally into individual
load profiles. These profiles are then perturbed with random noise
to introduce temporal variability to the relative fraction of the
aggregate each individual load consumes. The number of individual
loads𝑚 can be set arbitrarily and in our case study here,𝑚 = 30.7
Half of these were designated inflexible loads and the other half to
flexible loads. Centered around each of the individual flexible load
profiles are upper and lower bound profiles for the consumption of
each load in each time interval. These bounds are generated with a
sinusoidal function which allows parametric scaling of flexibility by
varying the amplitude and phase. S We note here that despite not
being able to access real-world load profiles, our load disaggregation
scheme produces qualitatively similar results to the load shapes
in [47]. The baseline load profile (black) and the flexibility range
(grey) are shown for the market in aggregate in Figure 2a and for
an individual load in Figure 2c.
5.2 Results
Figure 2 provides a detailed contrast between the traditional base-
line market design, under which shiftable demands do not offer
their flexibility, and the proposed design of this paper, under which
shiftable demands have incentives to expose their flexibility. The
reduction of curtailment of renewable generation that results from
shiftable demands is immediately clear from these figures.
In more detail, Figure 2a shows the generation dispatch as well as
the baseline aggregate demand. The available aggregate flexibility is
shown as a light grey overlay. Notice that renewables are curtailed
between hours 8 and 17, as there is an excess supply available to
meet the baseline aggregate demand 𝐷0.
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Experiments with other values of𝑚 did not change results qualitatively.
Figure 2a should be contrasted with Figure 2b, which shows the
market dispatch (aggregate shown in red) when flexible demand is
utilized. The flexibility upper/lower bounds (grey) and the baseline
aggregate demand (dotted black) are superimposed for comparison.
Load is dispatched up in periods with curtailed renewable (hours 8 -
17) and dispatched down during the remaining hours to compensate.
In this simulation, for the hours when load is dispatched down, the
lower bound on flexibility is often tight whereas the upper bound
is not attained at any point over the time horizon. This highlights
the point that both up- and down-flexibility are required in equal
amounts due to the equality constraint for total demand over the
time horizon (e,g., (1c), 11b). The limiting factor for shiftable loads
to increase demand during the middle of the day (and therefore
reduce renewable curtailment) could actually be their inability to
reduce its demand at other times.
Figure 2c drills deeper and considers the profile of an individual
load. This figure shows that feasibility of the flexible market dis-
patch for the load is indeed satisfied, as required by the constraints
in (11b) - (11e). The black curve shows the baseline demand d0
𝑗
for
load 𝑗 = 29 and the red curve shows the dispatch with flexibility
d∗
𝑗
. Both trajectories respect the upper and lower flexibility bounds
d𝑗 , d𝑗 . Further, all loads (and therefore the aggregate load as well)
change their dispatch under the flexibility dispatch allocation in
the same direction (i.e., up or down) in each interval. This is due to
constraints (9b) and (9c), without which the undesirable scenario
where some loads increase and other simultaneously decrease their
consumption could occur.
The case study also provides a concrete illustration of many of
the properties of prices we proved previously. In particular, the top
panel of Figure 3 shows this graphically that the baseline price 𝜋0
is a lower bound for ?̃? , a property proven in Lemma B.2. The lower
panel of Figure 3 illustrates that the flexibility price ^ satisfies its de-
sired properties in that it is positivewhen up-flexibility is dispatched
and negative when down-flexibility is dispatched. Its magnitude
also reflects a time-varying value of flexibility; specifically, ^𝑡 is
most positive during the middle of the day when renewables have
peak capacity and load should be dispatched up to utilize them and
is most negative early and late in the day when expensive conven-
tional generation dominates the generation mix and load should be
dispatched down to reduce cost.
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Figure 3: Illustration of energy prices ?̃? and 𝜋0 (top) and flexibility
price ^ (bottom) in the CAISO case study.
Table 1: Total revenue, cost, and utility for generation and demand
in CAISO case study. Amounts are in millions.
Baseline With Flexibility % change
Total Generation Revenue $11.91 $10.58 -11.14
Total Generation Cost $6.39 $5.39 -15.62
Total Generation Utility (profit) $5.52 $5.19 -5.95
Total Demand Cost $11.91 $10.90 -8.49
Total Demand Utility $-11.91 $-10.58 +11.14
Total Flexibility Payment $0.00 $0.32 —
In Table 1 we quantify the economic value of the proposed mar-
ket design as compared to the baseline design by comparing market
participant utility gains/losses between the two scenarios. The first
observation from this table is that the demand side of the market
increases its utility by 11% over the baseline while only needing to
re-dispatch 10% of its total load. As flexibility is provided by the
demand side of the of the market, our mechanism increases their
utility to compensate.
The second observation is that each load individually is at least
as well off under the flexibility mechanism as under the baseline
scenario, but loads that offer flexibility are better off than those
that do not. This can be seen by comparing total demand cost of
$10.90 to the total demand utility of -$10.58. The difference in the
magnitudes of these values is exactly the flexibility payment of
$0.32. Inflexible loads pay for energy but do not receive any benefit
from the flexibility payment, which only goes to flexible loads.
Third is that generators are worse off under the flexibility mecha-
nism due to a lower energy price ?̃? . Dispatching flexibility improves
the overall efficiency (i.e., generation cost) of the dispatch but be-
cause the spot price decreases as well, that benefit is not captured
by generators, instead going to the loads. From a generator’s point
of view, this is not desirable as it will lower their profits individu-
ally and collectively. However we remark that any improvement in
market efficiency is likely to lower generator profits (for additional
discussion of these see [33]). That does not mean that improvements
in market efficiency ought to be avoided though. Rather, we take
the view that incentives for improving system efficiency should be
aligned with those of the market participants who actually provide
the efficiency-improving service. In the setting we explore in this
work, the deserving participants are flexible loads with shiftable
demand.
6 CONCLUSION
This paper focuses on a crucial and under-explored aspect of de-
mand response markets: the incentives of loads with shiftable de-
mand to expose flexibility to the market operator. We first show
that relying on the energy spot price alone to compensate loads—as
the standard market design does—leads to incentive misalignment:
demand might end up worse off bidding flexibly than inflexibly.
Our market mechanism addresses this shortcoming in two parts.
The first constrains the total amount of flexibility that can be dis-
patched in each period, ensuring that costly generators cannot be
dispatched. The second introduces a flexibility price and distributes
the surplus that arises from the more efficient dispatch to loads that
offer flexibility.
The flexibility price serves two useful purposes. One is to provide
a time-varying signal to loads about the most profitable times to
offer their flexibility to the market. A second value of the flexibility
is to correct a free-rider problem that arises in an energy price-
only market: flexibility is a public good, which means that all loads
benefit from flexibility whether they contribute it themselves or not.
In our mechanism, the flexibility payment, which is the product of
flexibility price and flexibility dispatch, is only non-zero for flexible
loads.
Importantly, our proposed mechanism has the same basic struc-
ture as the current economic dispatch market design, which pro-
vides a pathway to adoption. In this work though, our model sets
aside several real-world electricity market features like startup
costs, ramping constraints, line congestion, and rolling window
market clearing. These undeniably impact market dispatch and are
the focus of large portion of research on electricity market design.
However they are typically evaluated without considering a re-
sponsive demand side of the market. In contrast, our focus here
is on the mechanism for incorporating shiftable demand into the
economic dispatch framework and analyzing the incentives that
result. It will be important in future work to tease out how the
above-mentioned generation-side characteristics interact with the
demand-side structure in our model.
Finally, another important open problem motivated by our work
relates to flexibility pricing. Our market design shows how to incor-
porate a flexibility price into the marketplace and proposes three
potential designs for flexibility prices. The flexibility prices we in-
troduce satisfy the minimal desired properties, but each have some
drawbacks and thus a further exploration of the design of flexibility
prices is an important research question. In particular, is there a
stable and interpretable flexibility price, aligned both with individ-
ual and social welfare objectives, that incentivizes loads to bid their
flexibility into the market?
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A PROOF OF THEOREM 3.2
Start by forming the Lagrangian for (1a) - (1e):














⊤ (p𝑖 − p𝑖 ) − `−𝑖




⊤ (d𝑗 − d𝑗 ) − [−𝑗
⊤ (d𝑗 − d𝑗 )












denote its optimal solution, which exists because the 𝑐𝑖 are contin-
uous and the feasible set is compact. Compactness follows from




must be finite. Strong duality holds because all constraints are affine
and the objective function is convex (see e.g., Prop. 5.3.1 in [9]).




(p∗𝑖 ) = ∇𝑐𝑖 (p
∗
𝑖 ) − _
∗ + `+𝑖
∗ − `−𝑖
∗ = 0 (13)





_𝑡 (1⊤p𝑡 − 1⊤d𝑡 ) = _𝑡





_𝑡 (1⊤p𝑡 − 1⊤d𝑡 ) = _.
The price vector, as defined in (2), is 𝜋 = _∗. Thus (13) is




∗ = 0 (14)
Next, we rewrite (4) equivalently as a minimization of −𝑢𝑖 over
the same feasible set and take its Lagrangian.
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L𝑖 (p𝑖 ; `±𝑖 ) = 𝑐𝑖 (p𝑖 ) − 𝜋
⊤p𝑖 + `+𝑖
⊤ (p𝑖 − p𝑖 ) − `−𝑖
⊤ (p𝑖 − p𝑖 )
The KKT stationarity condition is
𝜕L𝑖
𝜕p𝑖
= ∇𝑐𝑖 (p𝑖 ) − 𝜋 + `+𝑖 − `
−
𝑖 = 0 (15)













Now we show that p∗
𝑖
satisfies participation constraints. Outside
of the mechanism, the generator would produce p𝑖 = 0with𝑢𝑖 (0) =
0. This is because we assumed that 𝑐𝑖 (0) = 0. We need to show that
0 is a lower bound for 𝑢𝑖 (p∗𝑖 ).
In (14), when `+
𝑖,𝑡
∗
> 0 then `−
𝑖,𝑡
∗ = 0 as only one of the lower/upper
bounds can be attained at a time. But if `−
𝑖,𝑡























> 0, then `−
𝑖,𝑡





) < 𝜋𝑡 . So 𝜋𝑡𝑝∗𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑡 (𝑝
∗
𝑖,𝑡
) > 0. In each of these three
situations we get that 𝑢𝑖 (p∗𝑖 ) ≥ 0.
8
Note that we use the same names for primal/dual variables in the individual problem
as in the market dispatch problem. Although these variables do not represent the same
quantities, we hope this is not cause for confusion.
B LEMMAS FOR THEOREM 4.3
This section contains two lemmas used in the proof of Theorem 4.3.
Let d0 and p0 be the optimal primal solutions to (1a) - (1e) in the
baseline case (i.e., d = d), and let _0 be the associated optimal
dual variable for (1b). In the presence of flexible demand, that is,
𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 < 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 for some 𝑡 and 𝑗 , we get the following result.
Lemma B.1. Let ˜d𝑗 for all 𝑗 be optimal solutions of (1a) - (1e) with
added constraints (9a - 9c). Then for all 𝑗
𝑢 𝑗 ( ˜d𝑗 ) ≥ 𝑢 𝑗 (d0𝑗 ) .
The proof of this claim requires another technical lemma, which
we state and prove below before returning to the proof of LemmaB.1.
To proceed, we associate dual variables 𝛽 ∈ R |T | , 𝛾+ ∈ R |T | ,
𝛾− ∈ R |Tc | with constraints (9a) - (9c) respectively.
Lemma B.2. _0𝑡 ≥ ˜_𝑡 for 𝑡 ∈ T c.
Proof of Lemma B.2. Let (P̃, D̃, ˜_, 𝜌, ˜̀±, [̃±, ˜𝛽,𝛾±) be the opti-
mal primal/dual solution of (1a) - (1e) with added constraints (9a) -
(9c). The arguments for the existence of this solution and the exis-
tence of strong duality are the same as those given in the proof of
Theorem 3.2 (see Appendix A).
9
For each 𝑡 , there is a set of marginal generators N𝑡 ⊆ {1, . . . , 𝑛}.
By its definition, a marginal unit produces strictly between its upper






The KKT stationarity condition w.r.t. p𝑡 is
𝜕L
𝜕p𝑡
(p̃𝑡 ) = ∇𝑐 (p̃𝑡 ) − ˜_𝑡1 + ˜̀+𝑡 − ˜̀−𝑡 = 0. (16)








That is, all marginal costs are equal in that time for the marginal
units.
Next, we claim that no generator produces more than its baseline;
that is 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑝0𝑖,𝑡 for all 𝑖 ∈ {1, . . . , 𝑛}. In the baseline scenario there
are three groups of generators: those producing at their upper
bound, those producing at their lower bound, and the marginal
units. Those already at their upper bound are unable to increase
their production. Increasing the production of a unit at its lower
bound would incur a higher cost than increasing production by
the same amount for a marginal unit. In (17) we argued that all
marginal units have the same marginal cost at the optimal point.
Therefore they all would increase production or all decrease. Due
to the convexity and monotonicity of the cost functions, a decrease
in production would result in a lower value for _𝑡 by (17).
This leaves two remaining possibilities: 1) at least one generator
at its upper bound in the baseline case decreases its production
or 2) a marginal unit decreases its production. In the first case,
_𝑡 is unaffected since its value is determined by the cost function
of a marginal unit. In the second case, due to the convexity and
9
We assumed previously that a baseline solution exists for (1a) - (1e). A feasible point
for (1a - 1e) with added constraints (9a - 9c) is just this baseline solution.
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monotonicity of the cost functions, a decrease in production would
result in a smaller value of _𝑡 by (17).
For all 𝑡 ∈ T c, ˜𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 for each 𝑗 by constraints (9c). Thus
we have 1⊤ ˜d𝑡 ≤ 1⊤d0𝑡 for 𝑡 ∈ T c. By the power balance constraint
(1b),
1⊤p̃𝑡 ≤ 1⊤p0𝑡 .
From this we conclude that for at least one 𝑖 ∈ N𝑡 , 𝑝0𝑖,𝑡 ≥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 . Since
we take the cost functions to be convex and if 𝑝0
𝑖,𝑡
≥ 𝑝𝑖,𝑡 ∀𝑖 as we








_0𝑡 ≥ ˜_𝑡 .
□
Proof of Lemma B.1. We take the aggregatemarginal cost curve
of (1a) - (1e) to be left continuous. This is equivalent to always pick-
ing the smallest value of the subgradient of
∑
𝑖 𝑐𝑖 (p𝑖 ) in the KKT
condition for p𝑖 when the subgradient is not unique.
For 𝑡 ∈ T , the following are true:
• ˜𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 for all 𝑗 by primal feasibility from constraint (9b);
• _0𝑡 = ˜_𝑡 = 𝑐min because of (9c). By definition of T , 𝑐min is
always the marginal cost in T . Note that this claim requires
the assumption from the beginning of the proof. Otherwise,




Analogously for 𝑡 ∈ T c we have:
• ˜𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 for all 𝑗 by primal feasibility from constraint (9c);
• ˜_𝑡 ≤ _0𝑡 by Lemma B.2.
By definition of the price 𝜋 , 𝜋0 ≥ ˜_ follows from the above. We
have also established that
˜𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≥ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 only when ˜_𝑡 = _
0
𝑡 = 𝑐min.
Otherwise, 𝑑 𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑑0𝑗,𝑡 .
By definition of load utility in (5), we have that
𝑢 𝑗 ( ˜d𝑗 ) = 𝑈 𝑗 −
∑
𝑡 ∈T























= 𝑢 𝑗 (d0𝑗 ) .
□
C PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3
We prove each statement from the theorem in order, making use of
the technical lemmas in the previous section.
(i) First note that D̃ is a feasible solution for (11b) - (11f). The opti-
mal solution D∗ of (11a) - (11f) satisfies 1⊤d∗𝑡 = 1
⊤ ˜d𝑡 for all 𝑡 due
to primal feasibility.
10
Similarly, the generation dispatch P̃ satis-
fies 1⊤p̃𝑡 = 1⊤ ˜d𝑡 for all 𝑡 by constraint (1b) and primal feasibility.
Therefore 1⊤p̃𝑡 = 1⊤d∗𝑡 for all 𝑡 . Note that this is equivalent to
10
A feasible solution exists: observe that D̃ satisfies constraints (11b - 11f). An optimal




































^𝑡1⊤ (d∗𝑡 − d0𝑡 )
= 𝑆
Revenue neutrality is the condition when
Pay
demand
− Revgen = Revflex .
By the definition of 𝑆 , this condition is satisfied.
(iii) The proof of this result follows exactly the one for Theorem 3.2.
The KKT stationarity condition for p𝑖 is unaffected by the addition
of constraints (9a) - (9c).
(iv) By primal feasibility of d∗
𝑗









for 𝑡 ∈ T c. In the proof of Lemma B.1 (see Appendix
B) we showed that 𝜋0𝑡 = _
0
𝑡 = 𝑐min for 𝑡 ∈ T and 𝑐min < 𝜋0𝑡 for all



















from constraints (1c) and (11b)
we have that ∑
𝑡
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By construction of ^ , ^𝑡Δ
𝑗


































































= 𝑈 𝑗 −
∑
𝑡 ∈T





































= 𝑢 𝑗 (d0;𝜋0)
(v) LetM
flex
⊆ {1, . . . , 𝑀} be the index set of loads whose flexibility
is dispatched. Complementarily, Mc
flex
⊆ {1, . . . , 𝑀} is the index






0) = 𝑈 𝑗 − 𝜋0
⊤d∗𝑗
≤ 𝑈 𝑗 − ?̃?⊤ ˜d𝑗
= 𝑢 𝑗 ( ˜d𝑗 ; ?̃?) .
(19)
The inequality comes from the fact proved in Lemma B.2.
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𝑢 𝑗 ( ˜d𝑗 ; ?̃?) .
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